In his article, “Why Abortion is Immoral”, Don Marquis argues that abortion is “seriously immoral”, excluding extremely rare exceptions. In order to establish his absolutist position, Marquis appeals to an analysis and assessment of the act of murder–or, as he puts it, why “it is wrong to kill us”. His argument goes as follows: “what makes killing any adult human being prima facie seriously wrong is the loss of his or her future” (190), and aborting a fetus discontinues a valuable future–that is, life potential–which would have otherwise actualized (in most circumstances); therefore, abortion is seriously immoral. So Marquis’ argument clearly relies on two assumptions: (1) that a fetus is in fact a ‘thing with potential’–a potential for a valuable future, and (2) that some default environment will foster the actualization of such a potential. I think that these assumptions beg questions that render Marquis argument invalid; and such assumptions might very well have additional flaws, but (for the purposes of this discourse) such potential flaws will not receive an in depth examination.
The first assumption–that a fetus is in fact a thing with potential–begs the following question: exactly when and why does this so-called ‘thing with potential’ gain the status of a thing with potential? In other words, what objective criteria must an entity satisfy in order to constitute as a thing with the potential to experience a valuable future? Marquis does not addresses this question; however, according to his comments regarding contraception, I think it is safe to conclude that he would claim that this thing with potential is born into existence upon fertilization of an egg by a sperm. I cannot think of an alternative response that Marquis would offer. Anyhow, whatever Marquis’ (or anyone’s) response might be, such responses would face a problem analogous to the problem encountered when supposing that a fetus does or does not suit a particular subjective criteria for personhood–or “human being”, as Marquis words it. Thus, it seems to me no less arbitrary to suppose that a fetus is a thing with some potential for a valuable future life than it is to suppose that a fetus does or does not have personhood (and, for the present purpose, whatever criteria we might use to determine ‘personhood’ is irrelevant; but, for the sake of clarity, I will list consciousness, self-awareness, and rationality as common criteria in determining personhood).
Perhaps a thought experiment will better demonstrate the problem spelled out above. So let us pretend that a space traveler has just landed on Earth and he knows absolutely nothing about humans or anything on Earth–but he can conceive of and communicate an indefinite range of ideas. Now we ask him to look at a three-dimensional MR image of a fertilized egg (at any stage in its embryonic or fetal development), and then ask him to look at some little ball of clay; and, finally, we tell him that one–and only one–of the two is a thing with potential; we then proceed to request that he point to the entity with the potential to experience a valuable future (and why!), how would this alien respond? Let us assume that he refrains from guessing because he has no incentive to choose one over the other, and therefore gives us an honest “I don’t know…” Now, let us do the same procedures, except this time with a human doctor. The doctor, without hesitation, would point to the fertilized egg, and then we would ask him “why do you think so?” Doc might appeal to the physical structure and operations, and then appeal to its biological characteristics based on such. Or perhaps he will be less scientific and use some type of induction, saying something like “well, based on past experiences, almost every encounter with this type of thing has been followed by the development of the thing into an infant that eventually exited the mother’s body and experienced life…” I cannot think of any additional alternative explanations that are significantly different from either of these two, so let us see where they take us.
The first, more ‘scientific’ explanation–that physiological operations and the thing’s overall structural appearance warrant its potential–seems no different than confusing the genetic-biological* sense of human with the moral sense (as these two are described in Mary Anne Warren’s essay, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion)*. Furthermore, this latter confusion seems less fallible than granting life potential to a fertilized egg based on its physiological attributes; I think so because construing genetic-biological attributes as an indication of its personhood at least has immediacy regarding contiguity, whereas deriving future potential from present observations necessarily stretches the induction further. The latter point is especially important because Marquis explicitly states that a fetus does not require consciousness or personhood in order to render abortion as immoral; instead, Marquis believes that future personhood is sufficient to classify abortion as murder.
And this idea provides a smooth transition into an analysis of the doctor’s alternative response, which appeals to past observations of fertilized eggs and their developments over time. We have here another form of induction. Assuming that the future environment must unfold in a particular manner so as to afford the development of fertilized eggs into valuable lives, such induction must be appended with qualifications pertaining to all relevant components, such as nutrient supply and protection from pathogens. Hence, we are ready for an analysis of Marquis’ second assumption: that a fertilized egg will generally actualize its potential if not aborted.
A problem arises because the realization of a life potential is dependent upon a particular context and future circumstances. Therefore, Marquis is required to demonstrate a default environment that is being altered in order to reach the conclusion that the thing with potential is indubitably being deprived of a valuable future; and succeeding with such a task would certainly require extensive knowledge about the environment, especially its dynamics. But Marquis does not address this issue either. In fact, he argues as if we can just assume that the relevant contexts of almost all fetuses will sufficiently satisfy their potentials; yet the validity of Marquis’ conclusions relies on addressing this issue. Thus, such negligence is a weakness in his argument. Nevertheless, let us ignore this problem and assume that we can ensure that a potential will actualize based on our ability to control its environment.
Employing the following thought experiment we can test the condition which Marquis believes is sufficient to render murder as immoral, namely the elimination of a valuable life potential. Imagine that I have a special device capable of affecting a ball of clay, which has the potential for a valuable future (of experience) prior to being introduced to our super-advanced device. In order for the clay to actualize its potential it needs nothing more than to be connected to this device and have a button pressed, and then let be for nine months; after nine months this ball of clay will begin to experience a valuable life like ours. If I hook up some clay and commence this actualization process, and a minute later terminate it (for whatever reason), then, being that I’ve deprived this clay of its valuable future, have I therefore committed an act that is equally immoral to the act of killing an adult human being? Given that Marquis claims that depriving a valuable future like ours is sufficient to explain the immorality of killing a being, he would need to agree that depriving the clay of its future is equally immoral to killing an adult being. If this reductio ad absurdum is sound–that is, if you agree that depriving the clay of its future is not equivalent to killing a person, then depriving a thing with potential of its valuable future cannot be a condition that is sufficient to establish the immorality of killing a person. This reductio ad absurdum does not entirely undermine Marquis’ argument; instead, it demonstrates that he must do more work–perhaps adding another condition.
Now that we have examined some of Marquis’ underlying suppositions and, furthermore, illustrated their associated problems, let us consider Marquis’ general approach, which lends sole attention to the moral rights of a fetus. Not even once does Marquis explicitly address the role that mothers’ rights might play in deciding whether or not abortion is moral; he argues as if fetuses originate and develop on rocks or desks–or anywhere for that matter–and that their development occurs independent of any other being! As we will see, Marquis’ negligence exhibits a symmetry among anti-abortion and pro-choice arguments, where the anti-abortion positions are founded on the rights of fetuses and pro-choice arguments are founded on the rights of the carrying mothers. However, I must say that pro-choice arguments, such as those made by Mary Anne Warren and Judith Jarvis Thompson, are far less guilty of negligence–or biases. Notwithstanding this unbalanced symmetry, the (seemingly) inevitable partisanship to either the fetuses’ rights or the mothers’ rights illustrates the root of the irresolute nature of the abortion debate. And, that Marquis does not even acknowledge and comment on mothers’ rights or futures, I think indicates a weakness–if not a flaw–in his argument.
Moreover, Warren makes what I believe to be a strong case for supposing that mothers’ rights outweigh those of fetuses. “But even if a potential person does have some prima facie right to life, such a right could not possibly outweigh the right of a woman to obtain an abortion, since the rights of any actual person invariably outweigh those of any potential person, whenever the two conflict.” And immediately following this passage is precisely where Warren offers her reductio ad absurdum, which maintains that a space explorer ought to have the right to defer having aliens transmute his component cells into persons. I think that this reductio ad absurdum is valid and, hence, illustrates mothers’ moral superiority over the fetus.
If Marquis can soundly demonstrate that a fetus is a ‘thing with potential’, and that future circumstances will generally sustain so as to actualize such potentials, then Marquis would have a more plausible argument. Nonetheless, however, I think that possessing a potential for a valuable future is not, in and of itself, sufficient enough of a condition to render a fetus such rights that terminating it is immoral. In addition, I agree with Warren’s position, namely that an actual person’s rights indubitably outweigh a mere potential person. Yet, like Warren and Thompson, I do think that certain abortions might very well be indecent, but not strictly immoral.

Thought you might be interested in what I posted today: Purveyors of Yeast > http://liberezenfin.blogspot.com/2007/08/purveyors-of-yeast.html

I actually hadn’t stopped by for a long bit. I must say that your timing is good. I’ve been reading about inerrancy and infallibility. Good article and I’m looking forward to the next.

I like the layout of the site too. Nice font.

EI