Much has been made about the problem of Evil for theists. How can a good God allow evil? This is a problem, one that can be looked at in a variety of ways (see here and here). The problem of Evil is usually then seen as a proof for the non-existence of a good God. However, it is not just a problem for theists. Alan Rhoda, at Alanyzer, takes a brief look at the problem of Evil for atheists.

Alanyzer :: The problem of Evil is for everyone

1. Either (a) the atheist affirms that there is objective evil or (b) he affirms that there is none or (3) he remains agnostic on the matter.

2. If (a) then the atheist is committed to an objective standard of goodness, but whence does this standard of goodness come from?

3. If (b), then the atheist flies in the face of moral commonsense and gives up any objective basis for moral complaint.

4. If (c), then the atheist has the burden of explaining how it is possible that there be objective evil and also flies in the face of moral commonsense, which takes it as obvious that some things (e.g., torturing a baby for fun) are wrong.

Links:

• Theodicy at a glance : Religious Tolerance dot org :: Why do terrible things happen in the presence of God?
• The Problem of Evil for Atheists : Alanyzer :: The problem of Evil is for everyone
• The Problem of Evil for God : The Unsound Argument :: A Logical Impossibility
• The Problem of Evil for People : The Unsound Argument :: Rebellion

Was Augustine’s transition from a libertarian to a determinist?

Abstract:

This post is taken from a paper submitted for my class on the life and works of Augustine. It posits a forum where three people are invited to give their interpretations of Augustine’s works. The papers are then followed up by a discussion on how or if Augustine’s thought developed throught his life.

Henry:

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This paper will seek to plot out the relationship between the will, the salvific process and predestination in Augustine’s letter to Simplician, “De Diversis Quaestionibus Ad Simplicianum :”(I am using the translation by John H. S. Burleigh, Regius that was published in Augustine: Earlier Writings, Volume VI of the Library of Christian Classics, Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953. I have taken this translation from “Aggiornamento” on 10/5/2006. From here on out in the paper I will refer to this document as “Letter to Simplician.” )”: . ” The letter was a response to Simplician’s questions on the content of Romans 9.10-29. In Augustine’s exegesis, he wrestled with the question of why Esau was rejected and Jacob was accepted by God. There was a sense that Augustine is troubled by his conclusions; this was evident by his careful back and forth of objections and explanations. While a bit troublesome, it did lead to his final formulation of several important doctrines, or at least laid their foundations. His conclusion changed the way he and as a corollary, the Catholic Church and many of the Reformers, viewed salvation and free will. While his conclusions may have seemed in contrast to some of his earlier works:”(Augustine’s earlier work, On the Free Choice of the Will, suggests a libertarian view of free will that says that in order for there to be true love of God, there must be a choice to love or reject God. When this precept is taken to its conclusion, it excludes a pre-determining of human salvation.)”: , Augustine was committed to discovering the truth, even if it means admitting he was wrong:”(This is evidenced by the very existence of his work, Reconsiderations, where he goes through all of his previous works and makes corrections.)”:. This paper will show how Augustine came to modify his stance on libertarian free will and come to the conclusion that there was a consequence to Adam’s sin, namely that the will was unable to choose God. God selected some to have their wills amended so that they are free to choose him or not; of those enabled few, God had the foreknowledge of who will choose Him and who will not.
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This short paper will seek to examine and refute Augustine’s view of Original Sin and the ability of the will to choose to turn towards God. It was Augustine view, and the view of the reformers after him, that if one denies these tenants, then one is forced to adopt the views of Pelagius, namely that Jesus was just an enlightened man. I will employ three arguments to discount Augustine’s above claims. The first one involves a logical extension of the personhood of Jesus. The second argument demonstrates the need for a total free will as a prerequisite for sin. The third argument gives an alternate understanding of how God can cause faith and at the same time, faith can be freely chosen. Finally, an alternate view of soteriology will be given. |inline

Augustine wrote On the Trinity around 419 C.E.. This was after the Church had established the doctrine of the Trinity and now people were trying to defend the doctrine against heretical formulations. Besides the common charge of tri-theism, the greatest challenge came from the formulation of the trinity as presented by Arius. This Arianism, not to be confused with the Indian and Nazi idea of Aryanism, was very concerned with the authority of the Father. Arius promoted this so far as to make the Son lesser than the Father in their essential natures. After all the Son was begotten; since He was begotten, He must have been created. As something created, there was a time before He was created. Augustine sought to dispel these claims and to show how each member of the trinity have the same essential natures and how the Trinity was a necessary configuration of God. He did this in an interesting manner.

Augustine starts out book eight On the Trinity by stating some simple postulates of the Trinity:

• the greatness of the father + the greatness of the son = the greatness of the hs.
• the greatness of the son + the greatness of the hs = the greatness of the father
• the greatness of the father + the greatness of the hs = the greatness of the son
• God is the greatest Love
• God is the greatest Word
• God is the greatest Knowledge.

It is at first odd that two parts of the trinity are not greater than the remaining part. To put it in mathematical terms Augustine maintains the following:

How can this be the case? While I don’t think he explicitly says this, but if we take p to equal ∞, or infinity then I think it can work:

Each aspect of God is infinite. But wait, if they are each infinite, then would they not be equal to each other? Yes. That is were Augustine demonstrates the idea that each member of the trinity shares the same nature.

Augustine then uses a argument from grammar to prove that God must have a triparte nature. He examines Love. In order to have love, there must be a lover, a loved, and the action of love. Since God is the very embodiment of love, and he loved himself, he must have the three natures. In order to be love, God must at the same time be the object, the subject and the verb. Restated:

1. God is the highest love
2. Love has three parts
3. ∴ God must have three parts

Augustine repeats this basic line of reasoning for the ideas of Word and Knowledge. Since each part of the equation is dependent on the other parts of the equation, no combination is greater than the remaining part and vice versa. Likewise, the distinctions between the parts are imbued in the very nature of Love, Word, Knowledge and God. In order for their to be the word (Jesus), there must be the speaking of the word (the Spirit) and the Speaker (the father). There is no before and after here. There is no speaker until there is the speaking and their is no word until the speech and or the speaker. In this sense, we can consider the word to be begotten from the speaker and at the same time co-eternal with it. This is how Augustine by-passed Arius’ charge that the son was created and therefore was lesser than the father.

Why is all of this such a big deal? Why does one have to have a correct view of God and therefore the Trinity? Augustine thought that in order to love something, one must know it. How can I love my wife if I do not know who she is? Likewise, if one does not know what God is really like, then one’s love is misplaced. Augustine says in chapter 4 of book eight, “But indisputably we must take care, lest the mind believing that which it does not see, feign to itself something which is not, and hope for and love that which is false.” In other words, if your view of God does not match the reality of God, you do not really love God and your faith is a false faith!

All of this begs the question of how one can know God. In looking around, I cannot see Him, much less observe his trinitarian nature. Augustine says we can. He draws off of the idea of imago dei, the idea that humans are made in the image of God. This, coupled with his Neoplatonism, led him to think that with the turning inward of the intellect, one could grasp the reality of God. We have a mind and we know our own mind. In order to do this, there must be a mind, the knowledge of the mind and the mind that the mind knows. This parallels God. It is this way that we can realize that as we have three parts, God also has three parts. We are a lower image of God’s true image. Augustine is quoted as saying, “As far as we know God, we are like God.” This process brings about mystical overtones. With enough introspection and prayer, one can get glimpses into the reality of God. These flashes are fleeting, however and soon we are brought back to the material world.

In my last post, I referenced an argument put forth that aimed to show not only that God was mutable, but also that He must exist inside the temporal realm. I do not hold to that conclusion. While I think that God does change, much like a man changes his position while walking, God does lie outside of time.

This does not seem possible at first glance. If something changes, then those changes must be in sequence. If they are in sequence, then they are done in time. If the sequences are done in time, that which undergoes the sequences must also be in time.

I would say that while from the perception of an individual inside of time, God does seem to change within the temporal sequence. However, God only invades time as to interact with that which is in it, yet is still separate from the creation and as a result, is separate from time.

Yesterday I posted about wondering about Augustine’s ideas on God. This morning I read a post at Prosblogion about the impossibility of God being changeless and creating the world out of free will. Alan Rhoda frames the argument as follows: Can a Timeless God Freely Create?

1. God is absolutely immutable.
2. God has freely created.
3. A free act proceeds from a free decision from among several mutually exclusive possibilities.
4. Therefore, God made a free decision to create from among several mutually exclusive possibilities. (2,3)
5. A free decision from among several mutually exclusive possibilities involves a change of ‘intentional stance’ from regarding something as indeterminate (as one of several possibilities) to regarding it as determinate (as the chosen course of action).
6. Therefore, in freely created God undergoes a change in his intentional stance. (4,5)
7. Therefore, God has changed in some respect. (6)
8. Therefore, God is not absolutely immutable. (7)

The lynch-pin of the argument and one of critisms of a perfect and unchangeable God is number six. In excersizing free will, one is changed, whether or not that one is a person or God. Further more, I like what Rhoda hints at towards the end of the post, where he implies that does not employ mere logic in His excersie in free will. This point was first brought to my attention by Carmen Price, a philosophy doctoral student at Washinton University in her capstone paper at Columbia College: “The Necessity of Considering Motivations…”.

What are religions and philosophys that hold both one and two to do? Logically, I think that Rhodes has excluded the posibility of holding to both, so it seems to follow that one of them must be dumped or modified as to allow for the other. Which one takes priority over the other? I think that two takes the priority. Without it, one’s God is reduced to a being without free will, something along the lines of Aristotle’s Prime mover. Since the big three monotheistic faiths, Christianity, Islam, and Judeaism, all hold to a God that is active to varring degrees within It’s creation, this conclusion (Aristolte’s God) must be rejected. Instead it is better to either accept that God undergoes some sort of change in His interaction within time.

Cross posted at Theology for the Masses and Hundiejo.com