The following is a rough draft of a paper in my Gospels as Literature class. Any and all suggestions are welcome in the comments.

Introduction

The purpose of this research paper is to analyze the use of miracle stories in the Canonical and Gnostic gospels. The canonical gospels will be used to represent the Orthodox Christian community in West Asia and the Mediterranean. The Gospels of the Nag Hammadi library and other notable Gnostic texts will be representative of the Gnostic sects with the understanding Gnosticism was not a monolithic tradition, but had many forms.

First, the metaphysical basis of varying approaches to miracle stories will be examined with an emphasis on Hume and Lewis’ positions. Luke will be used as representative of the Canonical Gospel tradition. Each Gnostic gospel will be examined individually with the goal of surveying how each author uses miracles. Finally, the results of the Canonical and Gnostic gospels’ attitudes towards miracles will be compared and contrasted.

I will argue that in the canonical gospels, the miracle stories served a marketing function, drawing in the first and second century readers to the canonical gospels. The immediacy of the miracle stories to the gospel message formed what Hume would later term a “constant conjunction:”(Hume explained cause and effect as a mere constant conjunction between two events. For Hume, this did not necessarily mean that the two events were casually connected, only that the two events were )”: .” This constant conjunction served to link in the readers mind the practicality of the effects of the miracles and the way of life demanded by Jesus’ teachings as recorded in the gospels. The same power that manifested itself in the miracles was behind the teaching. This is the opposite effect that the non-canonical gospels intend to have on their readers. I will argue that the non-canonical gospels, the Gnostic and Docetic texts in particular, use miracles for a different function. The Gnostic texts only employ miracles sparsely, using them to emphasize the divine spark in everyone and the priority of spirit over matter. (more…)

The Scottish philosopher Hume had presented philosophy with a grand problem. Hume had tilled the grounding of the current metaphysics of the day. He had taken the postulates of Descartes and questioned them. He found the evidence for causality in the specific lacking, rendering one unable to point to the exact cause behind any certain event. Like all Empiricists, Hume wanted all philosophical systems to be grounded in immediate experience. He defined the two types of mental concepts, impressions and thoughts and ideas. Thoughts and Ideas are the recalling the memory of situations, and the anticipating future ones. An example of this is thinking about being angry. Impressions on the other hand, are perceptions of the mind that are the most clear. They include our more lively perceptions: when we hear, feel, love, hate, desire and will. An example of this is being angry. The difference is that �impressions are distinguished from ideas when we reflect on any of our sensations or movement. �

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As a skeptic, Hume did not like the idea of an I that produres. Why is this? Well, first lets get a concept of what Hume meant when he talked about I, or personal identity:

- The concept that I am, I exist as a mind of a certain structure that produres through time and changes

1. Memories, hopes, beliefs, a storage bin of impressions
2. Choice in what I think and that I have a sense of continuity, a sense of flow.

- I have a mind that has concepts in it.

Hume says that we should strip away from this concept thoughts, ideas, impressions - everything that the mind holds. Now, Where is the mind? Hume asks to show me where this thing that you call mind exists. Hume says that you can’t show Mind, Personality. It is meaninginless to try and .: it is of no use in philosophy. For Hume, the purpose of philosophy is to build knowledge. To Hume All that there is the changing elements. This can also be known as the bundle theory¹.

All one can percieve is the thinking; what is not percieved is the “I” behind the thinking. This is all done within a Cartesian framework. Since we cannot percieve the I behind the thinking we can’t know anything about the I. Remember, where Hume thought all ideas came from ² .

Q - Why do we think that there is an I behind the thinking?

A - It is convient. In the process of organizing the collection of memories we assume that there is a mind behind everything. But philosophically we cannot say anything about the mind, or that it even exists.

How does one start when approaching a classic such as this? One starts with an overview, then proceeding on to the writer, for he is its source, style, content, and finishing up with commentary. At least this is the route that will be taken here. The book, Miracles: a Preliminary Study, in contemporary Christianity is championed as one of the greatest apologies of the miraculous ever penned. However, in reality, most patrons have never read it. There is so great a wind about C.S. Lewis�s memory that anything penned by him is at once slotted into the �one of the greats� category. There may be reason behind the wind, which we will get to in a moment, but it is interesting to note that the mass of Christians who recommend this book have not read a drop of it.

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Hume broke all mental contents into two categories, “Impressions” and “Thoughts and Ideas.”

Hume maintained that Impressions were:

1. Sensate
2. All of our more lively perceptions (note the active “ing”)
   • Hearing
   • Seeing
   • Loving
   • Hating
   • Touching

All of our ideas have their root in impressions and therefore in sensations.

Thoughts and Ideas on the other hand are recollection or manipulation of impressions. Hume maintained that the recollection of an impression is infinitely less clear than the original impression. For example:

• Thinking of being angry
  vs
• Being Angry

Experiencing being angry is always much more vivid than remembering being angry.

Hume also maintained that the mind at first seems unlimited in its potential, but, following with Locke’s Tabula Rasa, the mind is actually limited to the base ideas that stem from impressions.

Here are some notes from Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals by David Hume on what he called “Relation of Ideas” and “Matters of Fact.”

• Every idea that is intuitively or demostratively certain.
• Examples are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and other math, Logic
• Discoverable by thought - don’t rely of world being a certain way
• Demonsratively certain
• True regardless of experiance
• a priori to experiance
• Nessisarilly true
• They are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without thier dependance on what is existant in the universe

• contingently true
• a posteriori to experiance
• The contrary of every mater of fact is possible (does not have to happen though)
• True contingent upon how the world happens to be.
  Science
• Our knowledge of Matters of Fact beyond our immediate experiance relies on Cause and Effect

Relation of Ideas are:

• Uncontradictory
  For Example:
  • 3 X 5 = 1/2 X 30 - Is always true
  • 3 x 5 > 1/2 X 30 - Can never be true

On the other hand, with Matters of Fact it is:

• Possible to have contradiction
  For Example
  • Case A: The Sun will rise tommorow - Can happen
  • Case B: The Sun will not rise tommorow - Can happen (not likely, but it is possible

  .

Here are some notes from Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals by David Hume on what he called “Mental Contents.”

1. Thoughts and Ideas. Recalling the memory of situations, anticipating future ones
2. Impressions: They are perceptions of the mind that are the most clear. They include our more lively perceptions: when we hear, feel, love, hate, desire and will.
   1. Example: Being angry and thinking about being angry. What is the diffrence between the two?

1. “Impressions are distinguished from ideas when we reflect on any of our sensations or movements” (Page 10)
2. Impressions are the origin of ideas and thoughts; ideas are the reflection of impressions
3. Impressions are vastly more vivid and therefore more forcefull than ideas. “The most lively thought is still inferior than the dullest sensation” (Page 10)

1. The origin of all our ideas come from the senses.
   - Every idea is copied from a similar impression
   - When people are deprived of a sense since birth, they are unable to convice of the corresponding ideas (Blind people know no color, Deaf people know no sound)
2. Thoughts are a faithful mirror of impressions. They are only copies.
3. All of our “creative” thoughts are merely the following operations involving basic ideas derived from the senses

1. Compounding (def: To combine so as to form a whole; mix.)
   - Golden Mountain = Gold + Mountain
2. Transposing (def: To put into a different place or order)
   - Rhino’s horn + Horse = Unicorn
3. Augmenting (def. To make (something already developed or well under way) greater, as in size, extent, or quantity)
   - [Ideas of Goodness and Wisdom] X [infinity] = God
4. Diminishing (def. # To make smaller or less or to cause to appear so.)

All ideas are naturally faint and obscure. It is easy to confuse one idea with another, they are not very distint. However, all impressiosn are stong and vivid. They are clear and very will defined. It is not easy to fall into error about them. When it comes to ideas we need to inquire: “From what impression does the idea come from?” (page 13) If we are not able to find a impression, then it is not meaningful

Link to PDF version

In the wake of Hume�s works, Metaphysics, as an objective philosophical discipline, was left in chaos. When applied correctly, Hume striped causality of its power and prestige. Metaphysics, the study of the underlying nature of the world, heavily relies on the idea of causation being intelligible. Hume argued that all meaningful ideas came from the senses and because we could not actually sense the causation of an event, our idea of causality in each specific occasion is unfounded. It was this difficulty that spurred Kant to rethink Metaphysics in general.

Kant tries to establish a set of founding principals on which to rest the foundations of Metaphysics. In doing so, he establishes four types of propositions: a priori, a posteriori, analytic, and synthetic. The first two deal with the origin of the proposition. A priori propositions are known from pure reason, whereas a posteriori propositions are known from experience. The last two types describe the relation of the predicate and the subject of the sentence. Analytic propositions contain in the predicate, knowledge that is known in the subject. Synthetic propositions on the other hand add the idea in the predicate to the subject. There are four possible combinations of the four types of propositions: a priori analytic, a posteriori analytic, a priori synthetic, and a posteriori synthetic. A priori analytic statements and a posteriori synthetic exist; their very definition allows them to necessarily exist.

A posteriori analytic propositions are impossible, for each of the terms exclude the other. Kant believes that Math, Science and Metaphysics lie in the last type, a priori synthetic propositions. It is questionable that this class of propositions exists. If it is not possible, then Metaphysics, as a science, cannot exist. If Kant can demonstrate that the class of a priori synthetic propositions does exist, by letting Math in, then he can use the same principles to allow Metaphysics to exist through a priori synthetic propositions. Kant uses a priori intuitions for a priori synthetic propositions in his first remark in the first part of the Prolegomena. His argument for the validity of a priori synthetic propositions of space and time are as follows.

1. A priori intuitions are known outside of experience.
2. Pure Geometry is an a priori intuition of space.
3. Pure math is an a priori intuition of time.
4. (C1). Pure Geometry and Pure Mathematics are known outside of experience.

5. Pure Geometry and Pure Mathematics are known outside of experience.
6. Pure Geometry and Pure Mathematics are the form of our ability to experience space and time.
7. Objects of sense are bundles of our experiences of space and time.
8. (C2). Pure Mathematics and Pure Geometry refers merely to objects of sense.

9. Pure Mathematics and Pure Geometry can only have objective reality on the condition that it refers merely to objects of sense.
10. Pure Mathematics and Pure Geometry refers merely to objects of sense.
11. (C3). Pure Mathematics and Pure Geometry have objective reality.

12. Pure Mathematics and Pure Geometry have objective reality.
13. Pure Geometry is an a priori intuition of space.
14. Pure math is an a priori intuition of time.
15. (C4). Pure Geometry and Pure Mathematics are necessarily valid of space and time.

Is the conclusion, Pure Geometry and Pure Mathematics are necessarily valid of space and time, true? In Kant�s view, three-dimensional geometry, or Euclidean geometry, is only possible form of space. However, with the onset of Einstein�s Relativity, we have learned that our previous intuitions about space and time were wrong; space is really four-dimensional and does not follow rules of Euclidean Geometry. This demonstrates the conclusion of Kant�s argument to be false.
Where in the chain of reasoning is the error? It is located in the original intuitions. The a priori intuitions that give rise to Pure Geometry, otherwise known as Euclidean Geometry, are incorrect. Our reasonings of the structure of space and of time were incorrect. If the reasonings before experience about time and space are wrong, what prevents the reasonings, or a priori synthetic propositions, before experience about the nature of experience to be incorrect also? If the reasonings about the nature of experience are also incorrect, then one is unable to correctly interpret experience. Once the interpretation of experience is rendered baseless, the foundation on which to build the science of Metaphysics disappears.

A man approaches a bus stop and begins to read his newspaper. A second man stands next to him, staring blankly ahead, anticipating the long, cold ride home. As the bus approaches, a young child, the age of eight, has wandered away from his parent and is seen by both men to be standing in the path of the bus, frozen in fear. The first man bolts across the sidewalk and scoops up the child before it was too late. The second man congratulates the first and wonders to himself why he was not the one to be the hero. What was the cause of the first man’s actions? What was the cause of the second man’s inaction? Were they determined beforehand? Was each a free choice? This is the problem of free will: “Are man’s actions freely made, or are they subject to causes and conditions like everything else?” If man is free to choose his actions, as most want to believe, then he is responsible for them. However, if man’s actions are determined, then how can one be made to bear the responsibility for those actions? The notion of freedom is so engrained in the values of our culture; that to suggest that all of our actions, from the basic decisions to major life altering choices, are all a fa’ade; is a very troubling notion.

Immanuel Kant summed up his version of the problem in the Prolegomena in the third antinomy in this way:

“Thesis:There are in the world causes through freedom.

Antithesis:There is no freedom, but all is nature. “

The only two logical possibilities were that either freedom exists, or did does not exist and the world is purely casual. He proposed an interesting solution to the problem. He maintained that both could be true at the same time. This seeming contradiction is possible if each of the statements is applied to different worlds, the Noumenal and the Phenomenal. If this is correct, how does it play out? What is the structure of such a case? These are the questions that will be answered in this paper.

Background to the Problem

Kant contrasts this view in the Prolegomena, his companion piece to the Critique of Pure Reason. In the Prolegomena, Kant attempts to answer the question, “Whether such a thing as metaphysics be at all possible? ” Metaphysics as a science had been called into question by the Empiricists, most notably, David Hume. Kant took their arguments with the weight worthy of their reasoning. The Scottish philosopher Hume had presented philosophy with a grand problem. Hume had tilled the grounding of the current metaphysics of the day. He had taken the postulates of Descartes and questioned them. He found the evidence for causality in the specific lacking, rendering one unable to point to the exact cause behind any certain event. Like all Empiricists, Hume wanted all philosophical systems to be grounded in immediate experience. He defined the two types of mental concepts, impressions and thoughts and ideas. Thoughts and Ideas are the recalling the memory of situations, and the anticipating future ones. An example of this is thinking about being angry. Impressions on the other hand, are perceptions of the mind that are the most clear. They include our more lively perceptions: when we hear, feel, love, hate, desire and will. An example of this is being angry. The difference is that “impressions are distinguished from ideas when we reflect on any of our sensations or movement. ”

All ideas for Hume are naturally faint and obscure. It is easy to confuse one idea with another, they are not very distinct. However, all impressions are strong and vivid. They are clear and very will defined. It is not easy to fall into error about them. When it comes to ideas we need to inquire: “From what impression does the idea come from? ” If we are not able to find an impression, then it is not meaningful. Hume maintained that our idea of causality could not be drawn back to any direct impression of cause and therefore the idea of causality is rendered meaningless. Our notion of causality is a mere by product of “constant conjunction”, or a habitual attachment.

Another impact of Hume had been on the categorization of ideas. He maintained that there were two divisions of thought, Relation of Ideas and Matters of Fact. Relation of ideas were discoverable by thought alone and as such, were a priori, they did not require the world to be a certain way to be true. Examples of this are math, logic and geometry. They were simply a relation between two thoughts. Take for instance the phrase, “All triangles have three sides.” The idea of triangles having three sides is contained in the word “triangles.” No experience of the world is needed to know that, it is purely definitional. The predicate is contained in the subject. Matters of fact, on the other hand are contingently true, that is they depend on the world existing in a certain way. Because they rely on experience for their validity, they are considered to be a posteriori. Because we do not know all possible experience, the contrary of each matter of fact is possible. The statements, “the sun will not rise tomorrow,” or, “the pot will not boil under high heat,” are possible, although not probable statements. Due to the case that matters of fact rely on experience all matters of fact that go beyond our immediate impressions are known through the “laws” of cause and effect. However, as demonstrated above, according to Hume we have no impression of causation, matters of fact that go beyond our immediate impressions are meaningless.

The Ideas of Kant

These ideas have serious ramifications for philosophy in general, and metaphysics in particular. Kant took these views to heart and found the fatal flaw in Hume’s reasoning. He had made a mistake in classification. He had classified everything into relation of ideas, or a priori statements, and matters of fact, or a posteriori statements. Kant said statements came in another flavor, synthetic and analytic. Hume had synthetic and analytic statements, but he had equated synthetic statements with the a posteriori class and the analytic statements with the a priori class. Kant took a hard look at math and said that there was no way that it was analytic and a priori. Math itself was a not an exercise in definitions, but instead was a creative, synthetic act, that joined together two previously unconnected ideas in an a priori way. For instance, nothing about the phrase five times five contains the equality with twenty five. The ideas are joined together, therefore they are synthetic; they also do not depend on how the world exists for validity, therefore they are also a priori. There could not be any a posteriori analytic statements because by definition, analytic statements contain in the subject what is in the predicate and therefore would not rely on the world for its validity. Kant, in one fell swoop, has laid the groundwork to completely circumvent Hume’s skeptically. Now that there is the possibility of a priori synthetic statements Kant is able see if metaphysics can be found with in that category.

In Kant’s search for metaphysics, he builds a unique view of space and time. Geometry is the pure intuition of space and math is the pure intuition of time. Not of anything in particular appearing in space or time, but the possible appearance of objects in space and time. The possibility of human experience is the big factor for Kant. For Kan it is the overarching rule. Causality is allowed because it is a necessary condition for the possibility of human experience. Human experience is still in the form of sensate intuitions from the outside world. These intuitions are our only link to the outside world. There are two consequences of this. First, since it is all we have to go off of, we might as will act as if it was truly representative of the world at large. Secondly, there will always be a buffer between us and the reality behind the sensate intuitions. The reality behind the world of appearances is described using a variety of terms. The two most common are “things in themselves” and the Noumenal world. Things in themselves refer to specific object affecting us through our senses. The Noumenal world is home to the extra phenomenal, or that that cannot be observed. Since the inhabitants of this realm cannot be observed, then surely reason must not be allowed to cross over. Kant considered such and exercises that overextend the bounds of reason and logic to be fruitless and said, “we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle of one (as the ancients said) “milking the he-goat, and the other holding a sieve ” Truly Kant preferred to abstain from such a practice.

When applied to the notion of Will, Kant’s worldview demands that in observation the Will but be caused. However, Kant allows that the Will, which is free, might actually reside in the Noumenal world and in action appear to us in the Phenomenal world as Newtonian reactions to their causes. Due to the nature of the realm that the Will presides in, one is unable to reason about the Will to determine if it is actually free or not according to Kant.

Modifying the Theory

All through out the Prolegomena, Kant talks about the conditions necessary for human experience. Consciousness, which is at the root of human experience, is in its essence, awareness. The concept of choice is so intertwined with the concept of awareness and with it consciousness, that it cannot be separated. If we are beings that are conscious, then we must also be beings that are free to choose. The concept of choice is also a necessary condition for the possibility of human experience. Human experience is possible, the reader is engaging in human experience even as this paper is read. As a result, the reality of human experience actualizes all necessary conditions for its existence.

Once the necessity of human free will is demonstrated, we must fit it into Kant’s worldview since we utilized the worldview to draw forth its necessity. Because all events in the Phenomenal world must be casually ordered as a condition of human experience, then the free will must lie within the Noumenal world. Behind every possible choice that the will can make there are conditions. The man reading the newspaper at the beginning of this paper could have decided to do nothing. If he had decided to do nothing there would have been an array of causes and conditions that would have lead him to decide that choice. This principle is illustrated in the below diagram.

For each choice, not matter how small the probability that the choice would be made, there are causes and conditions that are actualized when ever the choice is actually made. Before the choice is made there are multiple causes and conditions that could be actualized by the will deciding what conclusion they would lead to. The will chooses which choice to make and in doing so, sets which causes and conditions determined the choice.

Conclusion

When viewed in the Phenomenal world one can only see the choice once it has been made and therefore the choice is seen as having been determined. This is still in line with Kant’s view. In addition to that, the will does exist in the Noumenal world, yet we are able to know that it is free due to the fact of our own experiencing. The will is able to both be free and be determined by choosing amongst several options of determinations for each choice that is made. In a stick Kantian view is view would be valid, save for the necessary free will part. Yet, as the same way Hume limited himself in his methods and all that was needed was a little change in direction, Kant too is not above mistakes and the theory can be modified in the above manner as to allow the necessity of a free will while still maintaining almost all of Kant’s previous principles.

Works Cited

Hume, David. 1977. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Steinberg, Eric. Second Edition. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Kant, Immanuel. 1977. Prolegomena to and Future Metaphysics. Translated by James W. Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Pure Reason. http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/k/kant/immanuel/k16p/k16p23.html December 15, 2004