Marx’s theories stand and fall as one, or do they? Pals is very adamant that one must evaluate the totality of Marx’s theories instead of isolating and evaluating any one part. This implies, and is explicitly stated by Pals, that if one log goes rolling down the hill, the entire cabin will come rolling after it. However, is really the case, or does it suffer from the same critique Pals applied to Marx’s theory of religion?

The philosophic base of Marx’s theory was an innovative synthesis of Hegel idea of alienation absolute spirit and Feuerbach’s critique of absolute spirit. Hegel provided the process; Feuerbach aligned the process; and Marx discovered the “why” powering the process. For all its empirical problems, Marx’s synthesis had two redeeming virtues, the human work as a value of humanity, and the process of its alienation. This is surprising for a person that grew up during the collapse of the Soviet Union, had read Rand’s We the Living, and found constant references to the natural greed of the bourgeoisie attached to the theory. This creates a public perception that Marx had a low view of humanity. In reality, he maintained quite the opposite. Humans, while by nature were alienated, echoing Rousseau’s classic zinger, “Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains;” there is hope to realize their full humanity, as exemplified in Marx’s promise that, “[they] have nothing to lose but their chains.” Marx realizes this will be no easy process and that it might be bloody, violent, and take hundreds of years. However, the final result is as inevitable as it is justified.

Religion is part of what Marx called a society’s super-structure; therefore, a society’s religion was dictated by the society’s economic system, or base. Religion serves to placate the poor and justify the rule of the powerful for Marx. Marx purposefully ignores the “oughts” of religion and only focuses on the “is” of religion. Marx only cares about the roles and function relgion plays in society. It is here that he makes a fundamental mistake. In various religions, there are warning and exhortations against the abuse of the poor and injustice on the part of the powerful. Marx skips over the possible effects of Luke’s warning to those that are rich and laugh now, for they will mourn and weep. Marx would do well to exhort also the religious, not only the philosophers that the point of all of this is to change the world. In doing so, Marx also misses the subtle and important ways religion works to resist an unjust social order.

It is not the case that problems with the outworking of Marx’s social theory necessarily invalidate the rest of his theory. It only necessitates an attempt to modify the theory. Perhaps it is the case that the whole kit ‘n caboodle needs to be thrown out, or it might be the case that only parts of it need to be overhauled. It seems to be the case that Marx’s solution to human alienation needs to be readdressed in its particulars, however, Marx does have some interesting and perceptive insights into humans living in a capitalistic culture.

Overall, I found Durkheim’s theory on religion fascinating. It was very interesting to see how his youth paralleled other revolutionary thinkers. Newton, Galileo and several major philosophers shared several aspects with him. First, each was an exceptionally bright youth that came from religious backgrounds. They all went to prestigious schools, but found themselves either bored or at odds with the established methods, theories, and systems of study. Both Newton and Galileo thought the Aristotelian method and ideas that the European schools were teaching were terrible and did most of their productive study on his own. This freedom in thought was instrumental in their intellectual breakthroughs. It was the same with Durkheim.

For Durkheim, everything was split into the sacred and the profane. There was no good/evil distinction between the two. Religion did not replace magic as Frazier had thought. Instead, magic was a private matter; religion on the other hand, was a social concern. He rebelled against MĂĽller and Tylor’s evolutionary views of religion. Durkheim thought that this was the wrong approach. Durkheim thought that MĂĽller and Tylor had tried to de-evolve religion of the day into a primordial religious state. Instead, Durkheim thought that the proper approach discovering the basis of religion was to locate the most elementary form of religion and study it scientifically. He ended up using a massive and detailed study of Aborigine tribes by Spencer and Gillen. From this study, he concluded that the totem was not magical or animalistic in nature, but was a social construct that served to promote the continuance of the tribe. This was his founding principle. Everything else flowed logically from this premise. For instance, it is easy to see how the soul originally was seen as “fragment of the ‘clan within” when one is operating off the idea that
the totem is a symbol of the personification of the clan. Once one understands where the idea of the soul comes from, the idea that the clan continues through time irrespective of its members is a simple inference. Likewise, since the soul is a personal piece of the immortal clan, it too must also continue through time after the death of its host.

Without going into more detail about Durkheim’s theory, it should be noted that it is not without its flaws. The first problem pertains to his data set. If Spencer and Gillen’s report was flawed, then it follows that Durkheim’s analysis would also be flawed. This is not to criticize his method, just his results. Next is his assumption that there is a single cause of religion. Although it was good that he did not attempt to de-evolve present day religion into a primordial one, it might be the case that there are independent causes for the rise of independent religions. Also, Durkheim assumes that what looks to the European eye to be the most primitive religion is actually the most primitive religion. In fact, all present day religions, all of them, have all evolved the same amount. Christianity in Europe had adapted to its surroundings just as the Aborigines had adapted their religion to their current situation. Each is a branch from the evolutionary tree that is equal in length. Time has not frozen over for the Aborigines and thus it would be foolish to assume that there have been no changes to their religion over time. In addition, the Australian outback is a unique environment. It would be foolhardy to assume that religions situated in another environment would look the same.

Throughout the early development of Christianity, groups of Christians adopted certain apostles as their patrons. The most evident feature of these communities is the corpuses of literature that either were written in the name of the patron apostle, or have the patron apostle prominently featured in the literature. The best example of such a school is the Johannine school. A lesser known, but equally important school was the Thomasine school, located in Syria from at least the second century until at least the fourth. The works associated with the Thomasine school are The Gospel of Thomas, the Acts of Thomas, the Infancy Gospel of Thomas, and The Book of Thomas the Contender.

If these books indeed were from an extinct school of Christianity, which I intend to demonstrate, then a construction of their social world would be useful in the study of Christian history. James C. Scott’s theory of societal transcripts allows scholars to use a text to build a picture of how power is constructed and resisted by and within a community. Scott’s approach allows the humanities, and consequently Biblical studies, to avoid reductionism by privileging the social experience of domination and subjugation through the lens of human feelings and interactions. This emphasis helps to reduce the dependency and overemphasis on the material and social dimensions of societies found in material studies. Scott’s theory enables one to peer beyond the material to the experiential aspects of domination. Scott’s approach has been adapted from its original use in modern communities, such as American plantations in the eighteenth century, to communities in antiquity, such as the Pauline communities.

In order to apply the modified version of Scott’s theory to the Thomasine corpus, several preliminary steps need to be taken. First, the existence of apostle schools must be defended. Secondly, the inclusion and exclusion of the Thomas texts need to be justified. After this is completed, the texts are to be situated historically and culturally into the communities in which they were written and used. Only then can Scott’s theory be applied to the Thomasine corpus. Once this is finished, the results can be arranged chronologically allowing one to see how the group adapted to changing conditions. By analyzing each text through Scott’s theory and exploring the development of the group as the texts progress chronologically, we can more clearly understand the history and culture of the Thomasine community. Specifically, we will see that Syriac Christians from the second to fourth century used the Thomasine corpus to resist domination and to create their own alternative power structure.

Behold and beware the analogy, for it is at once a writer’s best friend and worst enemy. When used correctly, the analogy is a beautiful and simplistic method of illustrating or highlighting the truths in a complex or abstract system. When misused, it becomes the epitome of folly; one would rather have used bad data than to employ. Bad data can be replaced, excused by poor method, or revised. Bad analogies are, like diamonds, forever. Sigmund Freud made extensive use of analogies to illustrate his theories based on his extensive data set.

Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis was based off countless interviews with neurotic patients. Foucault’s explanation of mental illness aside, the theory psychoanalysis posited three basic levels of the mind, the id, the ego, and the superego. Humans have animal desires that are located in the id. The primal desires for meals, maiming, and mating reside in the id. These desires were in conflict with the superego, or the mind’s perception of society’s values and set of acceptable behaviors. The mind’s mediator between these two is the poor, miserable ego. Its task is to make sense of the two conflicting sets of desires. Sometimes the conflicts go unresolved; these are then repressed, or sent down from the conscious, through the pre-conscious, and into the unconscious. From the unconscious, these repressions affect the person’s life, but go unrealized by the person.

For Freud, religion was the result of one such repression. Without going into the details, Freud thought that belief in God was the result of an unconscious conflict between wanting a father’s protection and death. The development of humanity mirrored the development of a human. Because of this, humanity goes through the same stages as a human does through as it develops. Since religion originated in the past as way to cope with the “original crime of humanity,” the killing of the alpha male, it therefore belongs to a childish state of humanity. Now that humanity is all grown up, it should quickly rid itself of this childish neurosis.

As many have stated, including Pals, Freud’s theory of religion suffers from three major problems. First, there is no historical support for his theory. For instance, Freud’s imagined history of the development of Judaism is in complete contradiction with what is known about the development of Judaism. Secondly, Freud is improperly reasoning from analogy. Analogies only work if they explain similar systems. They cannot be used to deduce attributes of a system from attributes of a different system in lieu of evidence. There is no warrant for both systems to match up in every detail; otherwise, they would be the same system. It is the necessarily existing differences between the two systems that strip deductive analogies of their potency. Lastly, Freud’s theory assumes only accommodates monotheistic religions. Assuming that his theory was correct, it would only explain the origin and, as a consequent, only foretell the extinction of monotheistic religions. Nowhere in The Future of an Illusion does Freud deal with how other religions came into existence nor accounts for the development of religions separate from monotheism.

However, one need not stop with just three complaints. Even if his analogy is correct, there are still problems. This notion of humanity as now, and back in Freud’s time, mature itself begs a question. One could just as easily say that humanity was in its adolescence and closer to a know-it-all teenager than a mature person. As such, perhaps it is not yet time for humankind to get rid of religion. Again, as does Tylor and Frazer, Freud overlooks the good done in the name of religion. Finally, Freud blatantly commits genetic fallacy. He assumes that flawed origins invalidate the present status of something. The historical origin of an idea has nothing to do with its truth-value. Interestingly enough, common critiques of Freud employ the same error. In realizing that his psychoanalysis lacks empirical data, it is assumed that the theory of religion that evolved out of this theory must also be false. It could be that despite flawed origins, Freud got it right.

Lastly, and most importantly, religious people would deny that their religion both originates and functions different from how Freud says it does. Any theory that reduces a person or group’s religion into something that the practitioner(s) do not recognize does not do the study of religion justice.

The theory of religion employed by Tylor and Frazer highlights the importance of the idiom “he that knows one knows none.” This was evident on two levels. First, there is the importance of the change in methodology that Frazer and Tylor helped to introduce. The comparative study of religion brought with it the notion of religion as a “global phenomenon,” one that could and should be studied in part on a worldwide scale. Secondly, the readings demonstrated the usefulness in utilizing multiple and independent sources for one’s research. I am speaking here of the wonderful sense that both Tylor and Frazer’s theories make in the world of abstraction, but the trouble they run into under scrutiny.

It was interesting to note the differences and similarities between Müller, Frazer, and Tylor. While Müller thought that the origin of religion was found in a confusion of language, Frazer and Tylor thought that religion arose from a deliberate method of describing and making sense of a bizarre world. There seems to be a split between Müller and Tylor over the nature of the development of religion. It seemed that for Müller that there was a sole origin of religion somewhere in the misty past and one can find traces of it in the linguistic remnants in the Indo-European languages. Tylor thought that rather than study languages for clues of the development of religion, it was more profitable to employ Ethnology, or the study of a culture as a whole. Frazer took the same approach as Tylor and modified Tylor’s theory and replaced Tylor’s idea of animism with his idea of magic.

Both Tylor and Frazer thought that all of humankind shared the same mental capacity, but lacked the tested knowledge that their predecessors would have. For each, religion is an artifact of outdated ways to explain or interact with the world. It is good that Frazer begins to tie in the social ramifications of his theory. At the best religion was, in its totality, a false science. At worst, religion contains relics of a barbaric age. At either rate, it needs to be replaced. Both theorists agreed with this and suggested that it would fade into the same mist that encompassed the past above.

Both Tylor and Frazer seem to have missed several seemingly essential components to religion. Hardly anyone that practices religion today is merely trying to figure out how the world works. There is a component of that included in religion, for evidence of this, all one needs to do is to drive down to Kentucky to the Creationist Museum! However, people use religion in a variety of other ways. They use it to give meaning to their lives, or order their social world, among other things. Perhaps religion, as Keith Ward suggest, is continuing to evolve into something besides than mere science.

Its not what you think. I had the privilege of listening to a lecture (audio at the end of the post) given by Dr. Prothero Friday evening. (I know, how exciting is my life?) In it, he discussed his latest book, Religious Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know–And Doesn’t (nutshell).

I could not have been more impressed. Not only does he present a good and plausible solution to fixing American religious illiteracy, he also handles the study of religion the way it should be handled, with care and nuance. As he said in his lecture, the study of religion should not be taught as the doing of religion, where one assumes the absolute truth of a religion. However, the study of religion should also not be done from a position of New Atheism, where one assumes that all religions are absolutely false and are considered a stain on mankind’s nice white shirt, one that desperately needs to be removed. Instead, the study of religion should come from a position that neither affirms not denies the tenants of religion.

He opened with astounding stats on the religious literacy in America. He gave the results of his now famous quiz. They were not good. For instance, some people could name only one gospel, and more than a few named Paul as one of the four.

It was interesting to hear the history side of the lecture as well. He traced our religious illiteracy to not only to the separation clause, but also to the replacement of the Bible as the text people used when learning how to read. This happened not in the “dreaded” 1960’s, but about 100 years earlier when catholics and protestants could not agree on what version to use in schools. He also credits the Great Awakenings and denominationalism.¹ With the Great Awakenings came an emphasis on feeling instead of doctrine. This is the greatest legacy of the New Light Puritans (Jonathan Edwards included, despite his best efforts), Whitefield, etc. Denominationalism placed cooperation ahead of doctrine (rightfully, in my opinion) and this lead to a deemphasis on doctrine.

History aside, he also notes that politicians constantly evoke the Bible not only on the campaign trail, but also in arguments on the floor of the house and senate. Because of this brute fact, the populace should be able to evaluate these arguments. A class on the Bible as literature in high school would go a long way in helping this. He hopes that with increasing literacy in the Bible, politicians would no longer be able to say “The Bible says X on this current issue,” and get away with it.

Given the amount of violent clashes involving religion in the world, having the general populace educated in world religions² has obvious benefits similar to the ones in the previous paragraph. So, there is a civic need for religious education. By “religious education” one is referring to the study of religion, not the doing of religion in schools.

He proposes two classes be mandated for study in high schools, one on the Bible as literature and one on the religions of the world.

I appreciated his critique of the New Atheists, such as Hitchens. A part of Prothero’s book review of Hitchens’ God is not Great that was edited out summed it up nicely.

(Prothero talking about the part of the view that was edited out of his review in the Washington Post) “[Hitchens] actually starts the book with a vinette about how he lost his faith at age nine. In the part of the review that was not published, I said that it was unfortunate that his views of religions [also] stopped at age nine. In other words, I think a lot of atheists think, they get fixated on a really stupid understanding of religion and then they spend 300-400 pages bashing it. Where if they had just spoken with any ordinary religious person, the ordinary religious person would have said, “Oh, yeah, of course, I don’t believe that….”

Now, of course Prothero is not arguing for theism or anything, just pointing out one of the problems with New Atheism’s method of arguing. One of Prothero’s most significant claims is while religion is the most destructive force on the planet, it is also the greatest force for good. So, it makes little sense to write it off as a mere delusion, even though it might be one. It was refreshing to hear a leading figure in the study of religion treat the subject matter with the respect it deserves, while not giving it a pass either.

1. Some people think the second one wasn’t really an “Awakening,” but that is a discussion for another time. [↩]
2. a problematic term, but a necessary one [↩]

 

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