The following was brought up by a fellow alumni of Columbia College, Carmen Price. The paper was given at the 2nd Annual Philosophy Confrence at Columbia College. The confrence topic was personhood; the title of her paper was “The Necessity of Considering Motivations…” I do not have the text of the paper, so this post will work off of her handout, my notes and my memory.
Her formal argument from her handout is as follows: (conclusions are in bold)
The Necessity of Considering Motivations Notes
by Carmen Price.
- If S is a Person, then she is capable of reason.
- If S is capable of reason, then she is capable of acts directed by reason.
- It follows that if S is a person, then she is capable of acts directed by reason.
- S is either capable of acts directed by reason, or not capable of acts directed by reason, but not both.
- If S is a person, the it is not the case that S cannot commit acts directed by reason.
- S is either capable of acts not directed by reason or not capable of acts not directed by reason.
- If S is not capable of acts directed by reason, then S is not a person.
- If S is a person, then S is capable of acts not directed by reason.
- If S is capable of acts not directed by reason, then S is susceptible to some influence other then reason (i.e. motivations)
- If defining S as a person requires that S is capable of reason, then defining S as a person also requires that S is susceptible to motivations.
The implication of the paper is that personhood must require non-rational action, or the presence of emotion. This means that purely rational beings are not persons. This has some intersting implications in the personhood debate.
Using this argument, which I believe holds, Aristolte’s God, and most people’s ideas of Robots cannot be persons. So, it would seem that God, if it is a person, must have emotion as a quality. Likewise, in order for a Robot to be considered as a person it too must be capable of emotion.
What do you think?


